Motivation and emotion are viewed as different aspects of a single process in which emotion involves the "readout" of motivational potential inherent in hierarchically organized primary motivational/emotional systems (primes). The most basic readout, Emotion 7, involves adaptive-homeostatic functions. In species where communication about the state of certain primes became important, Emotion II, involving their outward expression, evolved. With cognition, a third type of readout evolved, Emotion III, involving the direct experience of certain primes. A model of the interaction between primes and cognition is presented, and the unique role of language in human motivation-emotion is discussed.
In recent years there has been a virtual explosion of new information relevant to the analysis of motivation and emotion that has left attempts at theoretical integration far behind. In the realm usually termed motivation, there has been increasing realization that behavior can be initiated by external stimuli and cognitive processes as well as by the biological deficits that have served as the cornerstone of the drive-reduction model. Mogenson and Phillips (1976) pointed out that any contemporary analysis of motivation must account for behavior based on the expectation of reward (incentive motivation: Bindra, 1968; Bolles, 1972) and for adaptive behavior that anticipates homeostatic deficits before they occur. The apparent ability of animals to make responses that anticipate their needs suggests that they must use processes that "represent within the brain the nature of the outside world" (Oatley, 1973, p. 12) . In this article I argue that such processes involve phenomena that have been traditionally relegated to the realm of emotion.
The major physiological models of motivation have generally avoided the concept of emotion, with its taint of subjectivism. These models include that of Stellar (1954) , which posited specific drive systems for hunger, thirst, and sex, based on excitatory and inhibitory centers within the hypothalamus; arousal theory (Hebb, 1955; Lindsley, 1957) , based on the brainstem reticular formation; and the analyses of reward-punishment mechanisms, beginning with J. Olds and Milner (1954) . Each of these models has proved useful and has gained some degree of empirical support, but none is sufficient to constitute a general physiological model of motivation.
At the same time, there have been events that have made the concept of emotion more acceptable to behaviorally oriented psychologists. Darwin's (1872 Darwin's ( /1965 
theory in Expression of the Emotions in Man and
Animals formed the basis of several propositions that have gained considerable support: (a) Emotion is based on activity in neurochemical systems in the central nervous system, (b) these systems are the product of evolution and reflect survival requirements within each species, and (c) activity in these systems can be modified by learning. These basic elements appear in Tomkins's (1962 Tomkins's ( , 1963 pioneering theory of affect, in Izard's (1971 Izard's ( , 1977 evolutionary-developmental view of emotion, and in Friesen's (1969, 1975) neurocultural theory, and they are consistent with much recent work in ethology (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970 . These investigators have demonstrated that the facial and gestural expressions associated with certain basic emotional/motivational states or primary affects are widely generalized 389 within the human species, thus supporting a major thesis of Darwin's. However, these investigators have not considered the physiological bases of emotion in great detail, tending to emphasize facial expression and other expressive movements in their studies of emotion. Also, they have typically emphasized specific primary emotions or affects (such as Ekman's happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, disgust) as distinct from drives (hunger, thirst, sex).
Another major type of approach to emotion emphasizes the role of cognition in interaction with physiological factors. This approach has ties to the classical James-Lange theory of emotion (James, 1884) , which posited that the subjective experience of emotion involves the cognitive awareness of bodily responses. Schachter's (1964) self-attribution theory and Lazarus's (1966) theory of coping have analyzed emotion in terms of the cognitive appraisal and labeling of external and internal stimuli. Mandler (1975) and Averill (1980) , among others, have expanded on this theme. This approach is powerful and is able to address a wide range of phenomena. However, as we shall see, it cannot easily deal with emotional phenomena that seem to be a product of brain activity alone.
A third type of theory of emotion, emphasizing central nervous system mechanisms, derives from the classic position of W. B. Cannon (1927) . In contrast with James, Cannon argued that emotional stimuli cause brain changes that, among other things, are a direct source of subjective emotional experience. Cannon suggested that emotional stimuli cause subcortical systems to simultaneously and independently inform the cortex (resulting in emotional experience) and the relevant peripheral bodily systems (resulting in bodily responses). Papez (1937) suggested that the bodily response involves the hypothalamus, which controls the autonomic and endocrine systems, whereas the experience of emotion involves the limbic system. MacLean (1968, 1970, 1973, 1981) later proposed the triune theory, which views the brain as a hierarchy that has appeared successively over the course of evolution: a reptilian portion (brain-stem, midbrain, and basal ganglia), a paleomammalian portion (including the limbic system), and a neomammalian portion (including the neocortex). More recent analyses of central nervous system mechanisms of emotion, such as those of Gray (1982) and Panksepp (1981 Panksepp ( , 1982 , can be viewed as progressive developments of this general line of reasoning.
This article suggests a basis for integrating these various views of motivation and emotion in terms of a readout of information relevant to bodily adaptation and homeostasis (Buck, 1980 (Buck, , 198la, 1984a (Buck, , 1984b . It is not argued that any of these views is incorrect, rather that they are substantially correct as far as they go, but that they are incomplete and that it is possible to arrive at a comprehensive model of motivation and emotion by taking aspects of each of these views into account. The goal of this article is to present an integrated way of thinking about motivation and emotion in their various physiological, expressive, and cognitive aspects. It is not my intention to suggest specific hypotheses that derive from the present position or data that would disconfirm it. I would hope instead that this position is judged by its ability to serve as a metatheory, an integrative mechanism to show the relation between theories that are designed to handle more specific ranges of phenomena. No new information is being presented; rather, this is an attempt to organize concisely and efficiently what is known and, in so doing, to present a new and coherent way of looking at the phenomena of motivation and emotion.
This article is structured in a series of propositions with their associated reasoning and documentation being relatively brief and often limited to a few explanatory sentences with references. The intent is to present a general viewpoint without becoming involved with extended discussions of specific points.
General Nature of Primary Motivational/ Emotional Systems
Biologically based primary motivational/ emotional systems (primes) have evolved within each species with the basic role of bodily adaptation and maintenance of homeostasis. The common characteristics of primes may be summarized as follows: (a) They evolve according to requirements for bodily adaptation and homeostasis, (b) they involve active internal processes, (c) they generally require internal or external stimuli to become activated, (d) they are based on innate mechanisms organized in the subcortical and paleocortical regions of the brain, and (e) they are special-purpose systems that serve a specific function in the species. These characteristics are discussed in this section and in the next two sections.
The term prime is suggested both because it serves as an acronym for the phrase primary motivational/emotional system and because prime has the proper connotations in that it suggests both an irreducible minimum that is the biological basis of the systems and an active internal process that requires external stimuli to reach expression (i.e., "he or she was primed to respond"). The unity of the concept comes from (a) the common evolutionary origin in bodily adaptation and homeostasis, (b) the notion of a special-purpose processing system based on a physiological substrate, and (c) the fact that, whatever their level of organization, the primes involve both motivational and emotional phenomena.
The reasoning behind the notion of primes proceeds as follows. Each species has evolved systems of behavior that respond to challenging stimuli in ways that are adaptive to that particular species. Adaptive responses are "those which bring the animal into contact with stimuli relevant to its survival (approach) and those which remove it from stimuli which are threatening to its survival (withdrawal)" (Glickman & Schiff, 1967, p. 102) . Because of general similarities in species requirements within the ecosystem of the Earth, and relations between species during the course of evolution, some of these systems are relatively universal (i.e., the needs for food, water, and oxygen among animals). However, others are quite specific, reflecting the unique requirements of a given species. Examples include the systems underlying the migratory patterns in many birds, the resistance to pain in the camel, the gnawing and burrowing behavior of small rodents, and the long period of attachment to the young in primates.
As these examples imply, primes exist at various levels of organization. At one extreme there are automatic unconditioned actions that are released by specific external or internal stimuli, including what have been termed tmpisms, taxes, endogenous automatic movements, and reflexes (cf. Cofer & Appley, 1964) . These are based on relatively simple neural systems and perform highly specific functions vital to the organism. At a more complex level of organization, there are the instincts or fixed action patterns, which involve innate tendencies to perform specific actions. These involve a number of coordinating neural mechanisms culminating in an orderly series of behaviors. These built-in sequences of behavior are characteristic of a given species and may be quite complex, but they are highly stereotyped when examined closely. At the next level are primary drives, which involve internal bodily disturbances resulting from natural tissue needs, such as the need for food, water, sleep, sex, air, temperature regulation, and pain avoidance. Drives do not result in a built-in behavior sequence, but rather energize behavior, causing the organism to search the environment for stimuli (food, water) that satisfy the need. This satisfaction or drive reduction serves to reinforce the responses that preceded it and thus encourages learning that is relevant to the satisfaction of the need. Thus the goal of the drive is fixed, but sequence of behavior leading to the goal is learned. ' At the next level are affects, which are the motivational systems most commonly associated with emotion. The primary affects include happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust (cf. Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Tomkins, 1962 Tomkins, , 1963 . Primary affects are based upon specific hard-wired systems in the brain, but instead of serving highly specific functions, they involve general response tendencies vis-a-vis the environment. The capacity to experience these affects is innate and unlearned, and each has been shown to be associated with highly generalized expressive displays (i.e., facial expressions, postures; cf. Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) . However, the circumstances under 1 In the case of acquired or secondary drives, the organism learns not only the sequence of behavior needed to satisfy the goal, but also the value of the goal itself: Initially neutral stimuli in the environment that are associated with the reinforcement of a biological drive come to be reinforcing (incentives) in themselves.
which they are experienced and the ways in which they are expressed involve learning.
At another level is a kind of prime system, analogous in many respects to drives, but in which the natural tissue need is difficult to specify. Some have suggested that it involves a need for stimulation on the part of the nervous system itself. Thus, R. White (1959) discussed the inability of the concepts of instinct and drive to explain the tendencies of animals and humans to explore, seek stimulation, and manipulate the environment, and suggested that the common property of these behaviors is that they have an effect upon the environment. He proposed that there is an intrinsic need, termed effectance motivation, for an effective interaction with the environment, which makes exploration, stimulus seeking, and a wide variety of related behaviors intrinsically rewarding. The result of effectance motivation is competence in dealing with the environment in effective ways. White suggested that effectance motivation is the motivational force that underlies cognitive development, noting Piaget's (1971) views regarding the development of a cognitive representation of oneself and the external world.
The primes are special-purpose systems that have evolved to serve specific functions and are associated with specific biological structures-neurochemical systems-that can in principle be identified within the nervous system. As one moves from reflexes and fixed-action patterns to primary drives, acquired drives, primary affects, and effectance motivation, the prime systems in question interact to an increasing extent with generalpurpose systems of conditioning, learning, and cognition, which have evolved to enable the organism to construct an internal representation of certain important aspects of the external and internal environment (including the state of the special-purpose systems). The nature and complexity of this representation varies with different species. This interaction allows the behavior in question to become increasingly flexible and open to both environmental influence and processes of selfregulation.
This flexibility is not contrary to the notion that the prime systems are themselves biologically built-in, special-purpose processing systems. Indeed, with the higher levels of primes, flexibility and openness to influence from the environment and self are hard-wired into the system. For example, in the case of a socially relevant affect such as anger, the affect per se is a prime based on a specific neural system that is universal to the species. The ways in which this system is aroused is, however, based on learning, and the social expression of anger is channeled by learned display rules (although it may leak out in expressive behaviors not closely monitored by the individual; cf. Ekman & Friesen, 1975) . As we shall see, even the experience of anger may be affected by learning: Some individuals may learn to ignore angry feelings or label them as something other than anger. The aspect of the angry response that is least affected by learning is its impact on adaptive/homeostatic systems. The presence of arousal in the anger system may potentially place the body under physical stress-that is, perhaps suppressing the immune system-even if it is not manifested in other ways.
To recap briefly, the prime systems are seen to be organized in a hierarchical manner, in which phylogenetically older and newer systems occur at different levels of the hierarchy. A visual representation of this hierarchy is presented in Figure 1 . At the lower levels are systems designed to perform relatively specific functions, whereas at the upper levels are systems that interact with general-purpose systems, reflecting the organism's experience in the environment. Thus one can think of a continuum in which learning and cognition play a progressively larger role as one goes up the hierarchy.
Each prime is associated with a physiological system or substrate. These substrates are neurochemical circuits that may be anatomically distinct or intertwined with one another. They may also appear at a number of levels in the nervous system; neural mechanisms directly related to sex, for example, have been identified from the lower spinal cord to the limbic system. Such systems may be characterized by their arousability or capacity to become active, and arousal or actual state of activity (cf. Whalen, I966). Variations in arousability function to increase or decrease the range of environmental stimuli that trigger psychophysiological, subjective, and/or overt responses. For example, von Hoist and von Saint Paul (1962) demonstrated that a stuffed polecat elicited no attack from a rooster until neural systems in the rooster associated with aggression were artificially stimulated. In the absence of the stuffed polecat, the same brain stimulation caused only motor restlessness in the rooster. Spontaneous activity in similar circuits in humans has been associated with subjective feelings of anger and a heightened readiness to react to aggression-eliciting stimuli (King, 1961) . Cases of violence associated with disorders in the temporal lobe have been attributed to fextreme hyperactivity to very mild aggression-eliciting stimuli caused by spontaneous activity in aggression circuits, which is caused in turn by abnormal electrochemical activity in the brain. Mark and Ervin (1970) cited a number of cases of temporal lobe disease in which mild stimuli (a baby crying, a brush against the arm) have elicited vicious attack. Studies of the electrical stimulation of the brain in humans have demonstrated that apparently complete subjective and objective emotional responses can be elicited that vary with the region stimulated (cf. Buck, 1976) .
The arousability of a neurochemical system is dependent on a large number of factors, including long-term influences (heredity, disease, early experience), short-term influences (blood chemistry, drugs), and interactions with other neurochemical systems (Moyer, 1971) .
Much has been learned about the nature of the neurochemical mechanisms underlying motivation and emotion, and new techniques for studying the nervous system promise revolutionary advances in the near future. For example, the brainstem reticular formation contains arousal mechanisms involved in attention and sleep-wakefulness, as described by Lindsley (1951 Lindsley ( , 1957 and others, and the specific regions and chemical substances involved are being actively explored (cf. Vanderwolf & Robinson, 1981) . Also, fiber tracts coursing through the hypothalamus are involved in reward-punishment systems, where a reward system is one in which activity is associated with reinforcement and a punishment system is one in which activity is associated with frustration, punishment, or nonreward (M. Olds & Fobes, 1981; Routtenberg, 1978) . The details of how these systems work are not yet clear, but there is evidence that the reward-punishment system contains neurochemical systems that affect intracranial self-stimulation, mood, learning, and memory in systematic ways (cf. Panksepp, 1981 Panksepp, , 1982 . Also within the brainstem and hypothalamus are a variety of neurochemical substrates that underlie species-specific behavior patterns. Valenstein, Cox, and Kakolewski (1970) suggested that electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus activates a wired-in hierarchy of behaviors specific to the species. The response that is elicited is the prepotent response for that species (i.e., eating behavior). However, if the goal object for that response is removed, the second response in the hierarchy often appears: Rats show gnawing and hoarding, roosters crow, gerbils thump their feet, and so forth. Other authors (Glickman & Schiff, 1967; Wise, 1968) have pointed out that these results could be due to independent neurochemical circuits in the closely packed hypothalamus being activated to differing degrees by the stimulating electrode. The occurrence of these species-specific responses may be internally reinforced, perhaps via the species-specific mechanism itself, perhaps via more general reward-punishment systems, or both (cf. Buck, 1976, pp. 76-77; Panksepp, 1981) .
The limbic system includes paleocortical structures (old cortical structures with 3-5 layers) plus the amygdala (Grossman, 1967) . MacLean (1968 MacLean ( , 1969 MacLean ( , 1970 suggested that the limbic system includes neurochemical circuits involving aggression and fear (particularly involving the amygdala) and circuits involving sociability and sex (particularly involving the septal area). Details of the evidence relating to these systems is summarized in Buck (1976, pp. 79-92) . Briefly, it is well established in both humans and animals that electrical stimulation of the amygdala often produces rage, whereas bilateral lesioning of the same region lessens aggression (cf. Mark & Ervin, 1970, and Terzian & Dalle Ore, 1955 , for studies relating to humans). Conversely, lesions of the septal area in animals is associated at least initially with heightened aggression, whereas stimulation of that area in humans elicits pleasurable reactions, often with sexual content (Heath, 1964a (Heath, , 1964b .
This consideration of the neurochemical systems underlying motivation and emotion is relevant to understanding the differences between typological approaches to the classification of emotion such as those of Tomkins, Ekman, and Izard, which assume fundamentally different emotion types (fear, anger, surprise, etc.), versus dimensional approaches, which assume that emotions vary quantitatively from each other along bipolar dimensions (strong-weak, pleasant-unpleasant; cf. Russell, 1979 Russell, , 1983 Russell & Mehrabian, 1977; Schlosberg, 1952) . A consideration of the neurochemical structures suggests that both kinds of system occur. The reticular system appears to vary along an arousal or intensity dimension (strong-weak) and the reward-punishment system may vary along an evaluation dimension (pleasant-unpleasant). The hypothalamus and limbic system, in contrast, contain neurochemical systems associated with relatively distinct types of emotional/motivational states (sex, fear, anger, etc.). Thus it is not surprising that emotion reflects both kinds of structure.
Motivation is a potential inherent in the structure of the primes. Motivation is a general term for the forces controlling-activating and directing-behavior. It is defined here as a potential that is inherent in the structure of systems of behavior control-in this instance, inherent in the primes. This conception of motivation as a potential is analogous to the notion of potential energy in physics. Matter may have potential energy by virtue of its physical arrangement (i.e., a coiled spring) or its position (i.e., a weight raised to a height). The potential energy is actualized by an appropriate stimulus, releasing the spring or dropping the weight.
In the same way, the primes are seen as having motivational potential by virtue of their particular qualities. These qualities of the primes have evolved to respond to stimuli and events that have proved challenging over the course of evolution. Their function is to activate homeostatic responses, expressive behaviors, and subjective experiences that have proved adaptive in the face of these challenges. Motivation is the potential for the activation of these responses that is built into the primes and is released by challenging events. Challenging events can be anything from the neurologist's tap on the knee (activating a relatively simple spinal reflex), to a receptive sexual partner or menacing enemy, to a lack of food, to Piaget's ailments (activating the process of assimilation and accommodation leading to cognitive growth). The primes that these events challenge get progressively more complex, of course, and the effects of the individual's prior learning experiences get progressively greater.
Thus, the primes are seen to be the basis of biological motives, in that they are the sources of the biological forces controllingactivating and directing-behavior. I argue that other sorts of motives are inherent in the structure of another system of behavior control, that of language.
Input from the primes is organized and integrated at higher levels in the nervous system. Evidence indicates that the right and left cerebral hemispheres play markedly different roles in motivation and emotion. There is evidence that the input of the primes to higher brain mechanisms is lateralized. The ascending aminergic fiber tracts important in motivation and emotion (i.e., the media) forebrain bundle) are right lateralized, and Denenberg and his colleagues (Denenberg, 1981; Denenberg, Garbanti, Sherman, Yutzey, & Kaplan, 1978) have shown that right-hemisphere damage causes decreased emotionality even in rats. Recent studies have demonstrated anatomical assymetries in the brain in most right-handed humans. The Sylvian fissure rises more steeply on the right side of the human brain than on the left, and this is associated with a larger area on the top surface of the temporal lobe-called the plenum temporale-on the left (Galaburda, LaMay, Kemper, & Geshwind, 1978) . This region forms part of Wernicke's area-an area long associated with language-and microscopic studies have demonstrated cellular abnormalities in this area in dyslexics (Galaburda & Kemper, 1979) . In addition, the left hemisphere has been found to be longer than the right and wider in the posterior region in most right-handed humans, whereas in contrast, the right hemisphere tends to be wider in the frontal regions (Geshwind, 1979) . The frontal cortex, in turn, has long been known to be important in emotion. Geshwind (1979) suggested that this characteristic shape of the human brain reflects the right hemisphere's specialization for emotion and the left hemisphere's specialization for language.
It has long been known that the left hemisphere is involved with linguistic functions, with damage being associated with crippling linguistic communication disordersthe aphasias. The functions of the right hemisphere were not as apparent, and for many years it was relegated to the status of the minor, silent hemisphere. Recent evidence suggests that the right hemisphere acts as a synthesizer, organizing input into complex and global wholes, and that this kind of syncretic conceptualization is involved in emotion (Tucker, 1981) . Thus Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel (1979) demonstrated that the disconnected right hemisphere is capable of producing an awareness-including an affective aura-in the absence of the verbal cognition of the left hemisphere. I use the term syncretic cognition to refer to this sort of conceptualization.
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A large number of studies using a wide variety of experimental measures and subject populations have shown that the right hemisphere plays a special role in both the expression and recognition of emotion. For example, the following findings have been reported: (a) Facial asymmetry orfacedness is significantly left sided during the posing of emotional expression in normal right-handed subjects, suggesting relative right-hemisphere activation (or, perhaps, relative left-hemisphere inhibition). The question of whether this is true of spontaneous expression as well, is unresolved (cf. Borod & Caron, 1980; Borod, Caron, & Koff, 1981; Campbell, 1978; Ekman, 1980; Ekman, Hagar, & Friesen, 1981; Sackheim, Gur, & Saucy, 1978) . (b) In normal righthanded subjects, right-hemisphere activation occurs when subjects answer emotion-related questions (cf. Schwartz, Davidson, & Maer, 1975) and are under stress (Tucker, Roth, Arneson, & Buckingham, 1977) . Also, there is considerable evidence that emotional information is processed more efficiently when presented to the right hemisphere via the left ear (Carmon & Nachson, 1973; Haggard & Parkinson, 1971; Safer & Leventhal, 1977) or the left visual field (cf. Safer, 1981 , for references), (c) In cases of hysteria, conversion systems tend to occur more frequently on the left side (Galin, Diamond, & Braff, 1977; Stern, 1977) . (d) Patients with certain kinds of right-hemisphere damage and also persons 3 The controversy between Lazarus (1982 Lazarus ( , 1984 and Zajonc (1980 Zajonc ( , 1984 is relevant here. Lazarus (1984) argued that cognitive appraisal is a necessary condition for emotion: "To experience an emotion, people must comprehend . . . that their well being is implicated in a transaction" (p. 124). Such comprehension need not involve a "highly differentiated symbolic process," in fact it may take the form of a "primitive evaluative perception" (p. 124). Zajonc (1984) replied that cognition must require some kind of mental work in the form of a transformation of sensory input and that "Lazarus has broadened the definition of cognitive appraisal to include even the most primitive forms of sensory excitation" (p. 117). This controversy would be clarified by the distinction between syncretic and analytic cognition: Both Zajonc and Lazarus appear to agree that some form of sensory information is necessary for emotion; what they appear to disagree about is what would constitute cognition. The concept of syncretic cognition might satisfy both, for it involves more than mere sensation, yet does not require a transformation of input, involving instead directly perceived analog information (see Footnote 9). Analytic cognition, in contrast, involves the linear and sequential organization of digital information (cf. Buck, 1984a; Tucker, 1981) .
whose right hemispheres are temporarily inactivated by intracarotid injections of amobarbitol have manifested symptoms of emotional indifference (Gainotti, 1969 (Gainotti, , 1972 Galin, 1974; Rossi&Rosandini, 1967; Terzian, 1964; Terzian & Ceccotto, 1959) . (e) Righthemisphere damage is associated with reduced skin conductance responding to pain (Heilman, Schwartz, & Watson, 1978) and emotionally loaded color slides (Morrow, Vrtunski, Kim, & Boiler, 1981) . (f) Right-hemispheredamaged patients have particular difficulties with emotional speech as opposed to prepositional speech (Heilman, Scholes, & Watson, 1975; Tucker, Watson, & Heilman, 1977) and with the recognition and discrimination of emotional faces and pictures (Benowitz, Bear, Rosenthal, & Mesulam, 1983; Cicone, Wapner, & Gardner, 1980; DeKosky, Heilman, Bowers, & Valenstein, 1980) . Buck and Duffy (1980) demonstrated that left-hemisphere-damaged patients are more expressive on measures of spontaneous communication than are right-hemisphere-damaged patients, even though there is much evidence that the former are much less able to communicate via intentional gesture and pantomime (cf. Duffy, Duffy, & Pearson, 1975) . This observation suggested the basic importance of a distinction between spontaneous and intentional symbolic communication (Buck, 1982a (Buck, , 1984a . Data in the Buck & Duffy study also suggested that the right hemisphere is responsible for spontaneous emotional expression, whereas the left hemisphere acts to alter, modulate, and inhibit such spontaneous expression with facial management strategies, such as those described by Ekman and Friesen (1975) . It is possible that the left facedness observed in posed emotional expression may be related to the inhibitory action of the left hemisphere on the right side of the face (Buck, 1982b) . This view is compatible with the suggestion by Tucker and his colleagues that the left hemisphere is associated with anxiety and the verbal modulation of the emotionality of the right hemisphere (Shearer & Tucker, 1981; Tucker, 1981; Tucker & Newman, 1981) . 4 In effect, the syncretic cognition associated with the right hemisphere interacts with the sequential, analytical, and verbal sort of cognition associated with the left hemisphere. I follow Tucker (1981) in terming the latter analytic cognition.
Emotion as a Readout Device
Emotion is a readout mechanism associated with motivation. Emotion is generally defined in terms of subjective experiences or feelings, goal-directed behaviors (attack, flight), expressive behavior (smiling, snarling), and physiological arousal (heart rate increases, sweating). One of the major assumptions of the present analysis is that emotion has evolved as a readout mechanism carrying information about motivation-that is, about the state of the primes-in a kind of running progress report. The source of the information is the motivational potential as activated by a challenging stimulus. Motivation and emotion are thus seen to be different aspects of the primes, in that motivation is the potential for behavior inherent in the neurochemical structure, and emotion involves the means by which that potential is realized or read out, when activated by challenging stimuli. The relation of motivation and emotion in this view is analogous to the relation of energy and matter in physics: Just as energy is a potential that manifests itself in matter, motivation, as seen here, is a potential that manifests itself in emotion.
5 Thus motivation and emotion are seen to be two sides of the same coin, two aspects of the same process. In contrast to those who argue that emotion occurs only when a motivational sequence is disrupted, this view suggests that emotion is a constantly occurring phenomenon, reflecting peacefulness and contentment when the organism is satisfied, as well as alarm when adaptation is necessary. The organism may tend to ignore emotional information under conditions of satisfaction, just as one tends to ignore the feeling of comfortable shoes on one's feet, but attention can easily be drawn to both.
I have suggested in another context that facial expression involves an external readout 4 See Gray (1982) for a discussion of the neurophysiological bases of anxiety.
5 1 am grateful to Gary Schwartz for suggesting this analogy.
of those motivational/emotional processes that have had social implications during the course of evolution (Buck, 1980) . This concept is here extended to include three different kinds of readout of motivational/emotional states that have appeared successively during evolution: Emotion I, involving bodily adaptation and homeostasis; Emotion II. involving facial expression and other mechanisms of outward expression; and Emotion III, involving an internal cognitive readout. Thus, although the source of the emotional readout is the motivational potential inherent in the primes, the targets of the readout are of three sorts: systems of bodily adaptation and homeostasis, systems of outward expression, and systems of subjective experience. I discuss each of these in turn.
Emotion I involves systems directly responsible for bodily adaptation and the maintenance of homeostasis. The basic evolutionary function of the primes involves the adaptation of the organism to the environment, insuring a proper homeostatic balance involving food, water, oxygen, temperature, and so forth. Thus, the most primitive and universal kind of readout of motivational/emotional states involves the systems directly concerned with the maintenance of homeostasis, and this remains true in the nervous system of more complex creatures. In all mammals including humans, Emotion I involves the influence of the motivational/emotional systems on bodily functioning via the endocrine, immune, and autonomic nervous systems.
The Emotion I systems, like other kinds of readout mechanisms, show species differences that are consistent with ecological requirements. Thus, species adapted to warm versus cold climates have differences in their systems of temperature regulation, species adapted to dry versus wet environments have differences in systems of water retention and regulation, and so forth.
Emotion II involves an external readout, with the state of the primes reflected in overt expressive behavior. Once the survival of a species requires the coordination of behaviors between individuals (for sexual reproduction, care of the young, etc.), it becomes necessary for certain motivational/emotional states to be expressed outwardly, allowing communication between conspecifics. Andrew (1963 Andrew ( , 1965 argued that certain kinds of emotional expression allow a coordination of behavior between individuals that is necessary to species survival. The threatening and submissive displays of many species allow the establishment of dominance without harmful fights, courtship displays allow the coordination of sexual behaviors, certain displays of infants encourage caregiving, and so forth. In his analysis of primate expressions, Andrew (1963 Andrew ( , 1965 noted that the use of facial expression and other kinds of communicative displays is a function of the extent of socialization of the given species and the communication demands of the environment, with the consequent need to coordinate social behavior. Social species show a greater range of displays than do species that lead solitary lives. The highly social plains-dwelling baboon, for example, has a wider range of displays than the more solitary forest-dwelling mandrill and drill baboon.
Thus overt emotional expression may be seen as an external readout device, with the prime state being reflected in the overt behavior. The nature and extent of the external readout depends on the ecological requirements associated with a given species: Turtle infants have little need of adult caretakers, thus there is no signaling system associated with infant needs that may be seen in birds, mammals, and particularly in primates, with the long periods of helplessness of the infant.
Emotion III is a direct internal cognitive readout of the primes that evolved in ways that are analogous to their external readout. Another major assumption of this analysis is that a cognitive readout of motivational/emotional states has evolved as an internal readout in much the same way that external expressive behavior evolved, and that this readout is direct, involving syncretic as opposed to analytic cognition. In effect, I am suggesting that the above analysis of the evolution of emotional expression may be applied also to an internal syncretic-cognitive registration of motivational/emotional states that is a kind of direct subjective experience of emotion. The reasoning is as follows: Once the nervous system of a species has evolved sufficiently to develop even the rudiments of a generalpurpose cognitive system-an internal representation of reality-1 suggest that it be-comes important that that cognitive system have direct access to the state of the primes. This process is presumably based particularly on the right hemisphere, although the details of this are still unclear.
This kind of arrangement would seem to have at least two major advantages. First, the readout of the prime state in syncretic cognition would presumably facilitate its handling via analytic cognition. In effect, the syncretically experienced state becomes an object for analytic cognition. This would encourage cognitive participation in adaptive functions and increase the organism's capacity for selfregulation. Thus we appear to know we are hungry not via stomach contractions or other signals of tissue deficit, but through a more direct, albeit little understood, form of syncretic information. Such information may be necessary for the kinds of adaptive anticipatory behavior and incentive motivation discussed above that precede homeostatic deficits and that have been recognized in animals (Mogenson & Phillips, 1976) and certainly occur in humans. Thus it may be that the Emotion III readout is useful and perhaps necessary for analytic cognition to influence bodily adaptation and engage in self-regulation.
Second, this system would allow analyticcognitive control over the outward expression of the prime state. I noted the importance of facial management techniques by which one controls one's outward display to fit the requirements of the situation by intensifying, deintensifying, substituting for, or masking one's true feelings (Ekman & Friesen, 1975): We look sad at funerals and happy at parties even though we may feel quite differently. Observation suggests that the same phenomenon occurs in animals; a frustrated and apparently angry monkey may express its "true feelings" only to a lower-ranking member of the group. Thus Delgado (1969) reported that a monkey's aggressive reaction to electrical stimulation in aggression-eliciting brain areas is affected by the dominance of the individuals in the immediate vicinity: A relatively dominant animal will attack others when stimulated in such areas, whereas a relatively submissive animal will be attacked by others when so stimulated. Some degree of analytic-cognitive control over the fight-orflight response must be necessary in social species where fighting and fleeing must be regulated for the good of the group. The analysis of such emotion "sending abilities" and their implications for personality and social functioning in humans is just beginning (Buck, 1979) .
This kind of control is presumably part of what is learned by the infant rhesus monkeys studied by Harlow and his colleagues (Harlow & Mears, 1983) . These studies demonstrated how the maturation of emotion systems within the brain is coordinated with social experience in young rhesus monkeys. The infant monkey experiences an initial period in which fear and aggression are absent, and it is in this period that a lifelong attachment with other monkeys is formed. Harlow argued that this provision for social experience has evolved within the species as a necessary feature of the rhesus monkey's social organization: In effect the individual must learn how to use in a social context the complex of displays and feelings associated with certain primes (Buck, 1983) .
The readout process is summarized in Figure 2 . The source of the readout is biological motivation, which involves potentials for the activation and direction of behavior that are inherent in the hierarchically organized neurochemical systems that I have termed primes. When activated by challenging stimuli, this potential is read out to the appropriate target systems in the body; this readout process is emotion. There are three general sorts of targets for this readout: systems involved in adaptation and homeostasis (Emotion I), systems involved in external expression (Emotion II), and systems involved in syncretic cognition (Emotion III). The functions of these readout processes involve, respectively, (a) bodily adaptation and the consequent maintenance of homeostasis, (b) spontaneous communication and consequent social coordination, and (c) subjective experience and consequent self-regulation. The readout process involves special-purpose processing systems that do not in themselves include general-purpose systems of learning or cognition. However, these do of course interact with one another. Indeed, I suggest that the Emotion III process has evolved in part to foster this interaction. 
Emotion and Subjective Experience
Each type of emotional readout is associated with a distinct type of subjective emotional experience. I suggest that Emotion I is particularly associated with interoceptive feedback from autonomic and endocrine responses. Emotion II is particularly associated with proprioceptive feedback from the skeletal muscles involved in the external expression of the prime state, and Emotion III is associated with a direct syncretic cognitive registration of emotion experience that is relatively distinct for each prime state.
Emotion I: Visceral Feedback
The role of autonomic feedback in emotional experience involves the classic controversy between the James-Lange theory of emotion (James, 1884) and Cannon's (1927) critique of that theory. Essentially, the JamesLange theory argued that emotional experience is based on feedback from the bodily response (both the visceral and skeletal muscle response) to an emotion-arousing situation, whereas Cannon argued that the effects of this feedback are negligible. The considerable research devoted to this issue has suggested that autonomic nervous-system feedback does indeed contribute to some kinds of emotion experience, although it clearly is neither necessary nor sufficient for all kinds of emotion experience (Buck, 1976 (Buck, , 1980 . For example, Hohmann (1966) noted that veterans with spinal cord injuries reported a lessening of emotional experience that was directly related to the degree of loss of bodily sensation caused by the spinal lesion; Delgado (1969) cited the case of a man who underwent a unilateral sympathectomy for cancer, who later reported that he could no longer be thrilled by music on the sympathectomized side of his body; and Bertrand Russell (1927) reported that an epinepherine injection by a dentist (which causes sympathetic nervoussystem arousal) produced an as if emotional experience-he felt as if he was joyful, or angry, or afraid, but the cognitive element was absent and the emotional experience was incomplete. This latter phenomenon is at the heart of Schachter's (1964) self-attribution theory of emotion, which suggested that a complete emotional experience involves an interaction between a state of autonomic arousal plus cognitions associated with that state of arousal. Schachter's theory seems consistent with most of the findings concerning the contributions of autonomic feedback to emotional experience, but it cannot handle all forms of emotional experience.
Emotion II: Facial/Proprioceptive Feedback
The importance of proprioceptive feedback from external expression in determining emotion experience was suggested by Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 , emphasized by Tomkins (1962 Tomkins ( , 1963 , and has been widely accepted by contemporary investigators (Izard, 1977; Kleinke & Walton, 1982; Kraut, 1982 , Laird, 1974 Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976) . These authors argued that the subjective experience of emotion depends on feedback from the expression of that emotion, particularly its expression on the face. The strongest form of this facial feedback hypothesis holds that if there is no expression of emotion, the emotion would not exist (cf. Tomkins, 1983) .
The evidence for the facial feedback hypothesis has not been conclusive, and there is reason to doubt the stronger statements of the hypothesis (cf. Buck, 1980; Ellsworth & Tourangeau, 1981; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979) . It would seem to imply, for example, that facially nonexpressive persons would show less evidence of emotion on other measures of emotion than would expressive persons. However, there is evidence that facially nonexpressive persons show larger autonomic (skin conductance and heart rate) responses than do expressive persons (Buck, 1979 (Buck, , 1980 . Also, the facial feedback hypothesis would seem to imply that a person's emotional experience should mirror his or her outward expression: If one looks happy, one should feel happy. However, despite the sentiments of the song "Whistle a Happy Tune," the ubiquity of the facial management techniques of Ekman and Friesen (1975) described above must guarantee that many facial expressions occur in contexts unrelated to the actual state of the primes. Several of the investigators who have advanced the facial feedback hypothesis in the past have recently restated their positions in response to the results of the Tourangeau and Ellsworth (1979) study, and in no case has the strong version of the hypothesis been defended (Izard, 1981; Tomkins, 1981) . 6 
Emotion HI: Direct SyncreticCognitive Readout
It is difficult to substantiate the claim that there are central sources of emotional experience that directly reflect the state of the primes in syncretic cognition apart from any peripheral visceral or proprioceptive feedback. Perhaps the closest one can come to demonstrating such experience is with the direct manipulation of motivational/emotional states via the artificial electrical or chemical stimulation of the brain in humans.
The effects of drugs in this regard are readily recognized. There is a substantial literature on drug effects that makes it clear that certain drugs affecting the central nervous system can cause experiential effects that, although not completely independent of cognitive expectations, can be overwhelming.
Regarding electrical stimulation, several relevant findings stand out (cf. Buck, 1976, pp. 77-102; Moyer, 1971; Valenstein, 1973) . First, it appears that strong emotional experience is not usually evoked by stimulation of the hypothalamus in humans, even though substantial autonomic changes have been observed (Sem-Jacobsen, 1968; J. White, 1940) .
However, stimulation of limbic system structures has led to dramatic alterations in emotional behavior, expression, and apparent experience, which at least in some cases seem beyond the control of the patient. Stimulation in the circuit associated by MacLean (1968) with fear and anger (i.e., the amygdala) has resulted in uncontrolled rage; one female patient stimulated in such an area via telemetery while playing a guitar suddenly smashed her guitar against the wall (Mark & Ervin, 1970) ; another woman stimulated during an interview demanded papers to rip up and pleaded "don't let me hit you" to the interviewer (King, 1961) . In contrast, stimulation in the circuit associated with sociability and sex (i.e., the septal area) often induces sexual thoughts (Heath, 1964a) . One depressed male patient described his father's near-fatal illness and condemned himself as somehow responsible, but when the septal region was stimulated, he immediately terminated his conversation and within 15 seconds exhibited a broad grin as he discussed plans to date and seduce a girl friend. When asked why he changed the conversation so abruptly, he replied that the plans concerning the girl suddenly came to him. [Another depressed patient] smiled broadly and related a sexual experience of his youth within one minute after onset of septal stimulation. (Heath, 1964b, p. 225) Other evidence comes from observations of patients whose left and right cerebral hemispheres were surgically separated to combat epilepsy. Gazzaniga (1972) cited the case of a female patient who was occasionally shown a picture of a nude women in the middle of a series of pictures of ordinary objects. She had an amused reaction to the nude whether it was presented to the left or right hemisphere, although she could verbally report the reason for her reaction only if it was presented to the left hemisphere. Sperry et al. (1979) cited similar instances in which emotionally loaded photographsof the patient; of his or her relatives, pets, or belongs; of pretty girls or fat women in swim suits; of public figures like Hitler, Churchill, 6 It is interesting that although the James-Lange theory also suggested that feedback from the skeletal muscles of the body should also contribute to emotional experience, most of the research has focused on the face. Studies by Riskind and his colleagues (cf. Riskind & Ootay, 1982) are beginning to address the role of the body.
or Richard Nixon-produced appropriate emotional expressions and reports of subjective experience, even though the subject could not verbally explain the reactions. Sperry et al. noted that "if anything, the emotional responses from the right hemisphere were somewhat more intense and less restrained and qualified than those from the left" (p. 157). This seems consistent with the notion that the left hemisphere exerts a verbally mediated control of the emotionality of the right (Buck & Duffy, 1980; Tucker, 1981) , and it suggests, in contrast to Schachter's (1964) theory, that emotional experience may occur in the absence of verbalizable (i.e., analytic) cognitions associated with that emotion.
Each prime state is associated with a particular pattern of expressive behaviors and a particular quality of directly registered emotional experience. Whereas the interoceptive feedback that constitutes the subjective element of the Emotion 1 process may be relatively similar for different motivational/emotional states, it has been well established that patterns of expressive behavior differ for different states (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) . Thus the proprioceptive feedback that constitutes the subjective element of the Emotion II process must differ for different motivational/ emotional states and could serve as one means by which different states could be subjectively differentiated. However, due to the aforementioned difficulties with the facial feedback hypothesis, it seems probable that the primary means of subjective differentiation of motivational/emotional states is through the Emotion III process, that is, through the different qualities of directly registered emotional experience associated with the different prime states.
This proposition is consistent with the evidence presented above regarding the subjective effects of different kinds of psychoactive drugs and brain stimulation. Also, it logically follows from the present line of argument. Thus, I am arguing that the internal cognitive readout of emotion evolved in a way analogous to the external expressive readout; it is useful for self-regulation just as the expressive readout is useful for social coordination. The pattern of expressive behaviors differs for different prime states because of this social coordination function; it would clearly be maladaptive if the expressions reflecting happiness and sadness were similar, for example. For analogous reasons, the syncretic-cognitive registration of different prime states would be expected to differ from one another, to foster self-regulation.
However, just as the external expression of emotion may differ for different individuals due to temperament and social learning (witness Harlow's monkeys), the subjective experience of emotion may also come to differ for different individuals.
Motivational/emotional experience constitutes a kind of knowledge by acquaintance, which then interacts with knowledge by description. I suggested that the direct experiential readout of motivation and emotion involves the holistic, syncretic conceptualization associated with right-hemisphere functioning, as opposed to the verbal and analytic cognition associated with left-hemisphere processing (cf. Tucker, 1981) . Syncretic cognition may be associated with what has long been termed knowledge by acquaintance, involving the self-evident presentation of immediate experience. William James described knowledge by acquaintance as follows:
I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it ... but about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are I can say nothing at all . . . I cannot impart acquaintance with them to anyone who has not made it himself . . . At most, I can say to my friends, "Go to certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come." (1890, p. 221).
In contrast, analytic cognition may be associated with knowledge by description, which involves the interpretation of sense data, requires inference, and is prepositional in that knowledge by description can be false. The distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description has been made as far back as St. Augustine in De Magistro (Marsh, 1956) , and it is reflected in many languages, for example, the French connaitre versus savoir (James, 1890) . More recently, it occupied a central place in Bertrand Russell's (1912 Russell's ( , 1956 ) epistemological theory.
Both James and Russell suggested that knowledge by description depends on knowledge by acquaintance and follows it in time: "Feelings are the germ and starting point by cognition, thoughts the developed tree" (James, 1890, p. 222) . This is consistent with the evidence presented by Zajonc (1980) that affective responses precede cognitive operations in time and determine their character (cf. Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Wilson, 1979) . However, in addition to contrasting affect and cognition, it is important to recognize the differing roles of syncretic and analytic cognition (Tucker, 1981, see Footnote 3) .
In applying this point of view to the analysis of motivation and emotion, it seems reasonable to suggest that the basic, raw experience of these states involves knowledge by acquaintance. The brain knows how to experience such states, just as it knows how to characterize the color blue or the taste of a pear. However, as suggested above, this experience itself can become an object of knowledge by description; the responder may learn much about motivation and emotion that may (or may not) be useful and adaptive.
There are important implications of this view that there are multiple potential sources of emotional experience. One is that the responder may learn to attend to some of them and to ignore others. Also, different aspects of emotion and motivation are differentially accessible to the responder, both because of the nature of the response systems involved and because of social and cultural factors. My next points deal with these issues, on which relatively little work has been done. .
Using Emotional Information
The extent to which emotional experience depends on Emotion I processes (feedback from adaptive responses), Emotion II processes (feedback from expressive behavior), or Emotion III processes (direct registration in syncretic cognition) may differ according to the individual, the situation, and the motivational/emotional state involved. There is little information available on how these different readout mechanisms might interact with each other in determining how emotional information is managed. Studies are needed that simultaneously analyze autonomic, expressive, and cognitive responses to a variety of motivational/emotional states.
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One area where some study has been done is in the relation between cognitive and expressive responding on the one hand, and autonomic and endocrine responding on the other. It is interesting that the results are relevant to the analysis of some of the classic defense mechanisms and to how they might contribute to emotion-related physical disorders. For example, denial and intellectualization might be thought of as response patterns that emphasize the cognitive handling of the prime state, and it is noteworthy that studies by Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos, & Rankin, 1965; Spiesman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, & Davidson, 1964) have demonstrated that such coping strategies can reduce the autonomic response to an emotional stimulus. Conversely, repression might be conceptualized as a process in which expressive and cognitive responses are suppressed, and it might be expected that reliance on basic homeostatic and adaptive response may be increased under those circumstances. This is supported by the findings noted above that facially and/or verbally expressive persons have smaller autonomic and endocrine responses to emotional stimuli than do nonexpressive persons (Buck, 1975 (Buck, , 1979 (Buck, , 1981b Buck, Miller, & Caul, 1974; Frankenhauser, 1978) . Together, these findings suggest the general hypothesis that the strength of the Emotion I process may be negatively correlated with the strength of the Emotion II and Emotion III processes. Put another way, the degree of autonomic/endocrine responding to a prime state may be negatively related to the expressive and cognitive responses to that state. 8 This autonomic/endocrine response could well have disruptive effects, perhaps involving the immune system, which could contribute 7 1 have argued elsewhere that Emotion II and Emotion III responses tend to vary together because both are open to social influence, albeit in different ways, whereas physiological responses (Emotion I) remain relatively free of such influences (see Buck, 1971 Buck, , 1984a . Much more research is needed in this area. 8 It should be noted that these studies used betweensubjects designs. Thus they suggest negative intersubject correlations between autonomic and other modes of response and are not relevant to the analysis of intrasubject relations between these variables (cf. Buck, 1980) . to disease (Hurst, Jenkins, & Rose, 1976; Selye, 1976) . Impaired emotional expression has been associated with a number of quite different disease processes. McClelland (1982) has reported relations between inhibited personality patterns, sympathetic activation, impaired immune system functioning, and cardiovascular disease. Sifneos (1973) coined the term alexithymia to describe the inability to express one's feelings verbally. This quality has been found to be prevalent in patients with a variety of psychosomatic illnesses (Flannery, 1977; Pierloot & Vinck, 1977; Wolff, 1977) , and Anderson (1981) has suggested that "impairment in the expression of affect is a necessary but not sufficient factor in the development of psychosomatic disease" (p. 149). There is also evidence that a limited ability to express depression, anger, and anxiety is associated with a predisposition to the development of cancer (Hagnell, 1966; Thomas & Greenstreet, 1973) , and the loss of significant personal relationship and feelings of hopelessness often occur near the time of the clinical onset of cancer (Bahnson & Bahnson, 1966; Greene, 1966; LeShan & Worthington, 1956; Schmale & Iker, 1966) . Emotional expression is also important in the process of coping with cancer and may play a significant role in its clinical course (Mclntosh, 1974; Peterson, Popkins, & Hall, 1981; Weisman, 1976; Weisman & Sobel, 1979; Weisman & Worden, 1977) .
Social learning relevant to motivation and emotion is influenced by the accessibility of the responses involved in the life of the individual.
The apparent medical consequences of unhealthy forms of emotional expression lend urgency to the understanding of how positive patterns of expression might be fostered in the developing child. The importance of social learning by observation and imitation are well-known (Bandura, 1977; Bandura & Walters, 1963) . One of the features of the realm of motivation and emotion that contributes to its complexity is that many of the relevant responses are virtually invisible or inaccessible to observers under most conditions, and may be only vaguely experienced by the responder. This is particularly the case with the Emotion I types of autonomic, endocrine, and immune system responses. Other responses (expressive responses associated with Emotion II and syncretic-cognitive responses associated with Emotion III) may or may not be accessible to others depending on the responder's expressive behavior and selfreports. As a result, learning to deal with hunger, pain, sexuality, anger, and so forth, is not a simple matter from an observational learning point of view (Buck, 1971 (Buck, , 1981a (Buck, , 1983 .
Many studies of modeling and imitation imply that the ways in which children learn to deal with emotional information-to express emotion to others and attend to emotional information in themselves-must be affected by the ways that others around them respond. In a 1933 study of muscle relaxation, M. A. Wenger (cited in Wenger & Bagchi, 1961) was surprised to note that the ability of a student from India to control his physiological activity far surpassed the ability of the American students in the study. Later studies performed in India confirmed that the Yogic exercises and other practices learned in that culture allow substantial control of autonomic activity Wenger, Bagchi, & Anand, 1961) . Perhaps in the course of such learning, the responder comes to attend to interoceptive and proprioceptive information regarding the motivational/emotional states to a greater extent than an American student would be likely to do.
Such an education of attention could potentially lead to markedly different sorts of emotional experience in different persons. Thus there is evidence that adult males in our culture are less facially and verbally expressive and more physiologically responsive than are females to certain affective stimuli, and that this difference may begin to appear in childhood (Buck, 1975 (Buck, , 1977 (Buck, , 1981b Frankenhauser, 1978) . Perhaps this is associated with the dearth of male models that show expressive behavior or discuss their ways of coping with certain motivational/ emotional states. Conversely, young females in our culture may have relatively few adult models for coping openly with achievement strivings or anger. Thus, although, as noted above, an affect like anger is based on a specific neural system common to all and the experience of anger caused by arousal in this system is similar in all and is to some extent self-explanatory, an individual may learn to attend to or to ignore this experience to different extents, and may learn to label the experience incorrectly. Thus it is quite conceivable that a child would never connect the verbal label anger with that experience. Thus, learning about how to handle emotional information may vary greatly from individual to individual.
Models in the mass media may have considerable impact in this area. It seems possible that much of the powerful interest in music, drama, and literature shown by humans derives from the fact that they can make accessible aspects of emotion and ways of handling emotional information that are otherwise hidden, providing in fantasy a model of motivational and emotional experience and expression that is informative about many things that remain inaccessible in normal life. One can follow the experiences and thoughts of the characters in a novel or in a soap opera, or witness displays of feeling on the stage or screen, that in normal life are at least fragmented and often unavailable, and can compare these to one's own experiences, thoughts, and feelings. McClelland's (1961) finding that high levels of achievement in a culture are preceded by high levels of achievement imagery in literature is consistent with the notion that the content of these tales may provide important models for the individual; the child who learns how it feels to achieve through such models may be more likely to be an achiever.
McClelland's methods could be employed to analyze the social consequences of different models of emotional expression on the emotional education within a society (Buck, 1983) . It is noteworthy in this regard that in a study of the emotional responses to music videos, I found that the degree to which a music video evokes the emotion it was apparently meant to evoke is related to the liking of the video, even if the emotion evoked is negative. Thus, just as a happy video is liked if it elicits rated feelings of happiness, a frightening video is liked if it elicits feelings of fear, and a sad video is liked if it elicits feelings of sadness. Moreover, liking for all of the music videos was strongly related to rated feelings of interest, regardless of their emotional appeal (Buck, 1985) . The latter finding supports the notion that exposure to the music videos involves a kind of exploratory behavior-a process of exploring one's own feelings. Apparently, the exploration even of feelings of fear, sadness, and aggression can be highly rewarding, and this may explain the high levels of interest in some persons in horror movies, tear jerkers, aggressive films, and the like. All of these films could thus contribute to the emotional education of the viewer, and this process could in the long run have important personal and social consequences.
The Interaction Between Primary Motivational/Emotional Systems and Cognition: A Model
Complex motives and emotions can be conceptualized as an interaction between the prime states and analytic cognition. To recap briefly, the primary motivational/emotional systems (primes) are innate, biologically based special-purpose systems whose state of arousal is read out via adaptive-homeostatic responses, expressive behavior, and direct subjective experience. However, these responses are affected by analytic cognition. Cognition can be regarded as a general-purpose system involving the ability to represent the nature of the external and internal environment within the brain, to paraphrase Galley's (1973) terms quoted above. Analytic cognition involves knowledge by description, which is achieved via learning and is particularly dependent on the sequential processing associated in humans with the left cerebral hemisphere (Tucker, 1981) . It is the interaction between analytic cognition and the primes that makes possible incentive motivation and anticipatory adaptive behavior in both animals and humans. In humans, our larger analytic cognitive capacity-combined as we shall see with the revolutionary impact of language-underlies a great repertoire of motivational and emotional phenomena.
A general model of this interactive relation between the primes and the cognitive system is presented in Figure 3 . The model assumes that internal and external affective stimuli initially impinge on the primes directly and without cognitive mediation (cf. Gibson, 1966, 1979; Zajonc, 1980) . 9 The responses of these systems is determined by their state of arousal and arousability, which in turn is determined by a variety of situational and constitutional factors. The initial response to the stimuli is also influenced by classically conditioned associations with the affective stimuli that are unique to the individual. Together, the primes and these conditioned responses determine the impact of the affective stimuli for that particular individual in that particular situation.
This impact is registered at both cognitive and emotional levels. On the emotional level, adaptive/homeostatic mechanisms are activated (Emotion I), there are tendencies toward spontaneous expressive behaviors (Emotion II), and subjective experiences occur, both directly in syncretic cognition from the activation of the primes (Emotion III) and indirectly via proprioceptive and autonomic feedback (dashed lines). On the analytic-cognitive level, the individual understands and interprets, or appraises, the stimuli on the basis of past experience, the present situation, and the subjective emotional experience. Once the stimulus is understood and appraised, or labeled, the individual has a basis for making appropriate goal-directed coping responses and self-reports describing the response to the stimulus. These overt responses are affected by display rules the individual has learned in that particular situation, which may also interfere with spontaneous expressive tendencies. That is, the individual may alter his or her overt emotional/motivational behavior to fit the requirements and expectations of a given social situation. At the same time, the labeled emotional/motivational state may become an internal stimulus in itself, beginning another cycle of response.
The fundamental difference between animal and human motivation/emotion involves language. The interaction between the primes 9 Certain cognitive approaches to emotion deny that affective stimuli per se can cause emotion without some kind of cognitive mediation, such as Lazarus's (1984) appraisal process. Gibson's theory, however, argued that the organism naturally detects information that is ecologically significant-the perceptual system has evolved to be attuned to such information-and that this process is direct and requires no cognitive mediation (cf. Gibson, 1966 Gibson, , 1979 Shaw & Bransford, 1977) . This argument applies to affectively relevant information, and indeed there is considerable evidence of an innate preparedness to respond appropriately to affective displays in others (Buck, 1984a, pp. 40-46) . Sackett (1966) demonstrated that isolated monkeys react with appropriate fearful behavior when confronted with a photograph of a large male making a threat display, and Perrett, Rolls, & Caan (1982) found that cells in a specific area of the temporal lobe in monkeys respond only to faces. In humans, facial expressions of fear and anger are more readily associated with aversive events than are happy or neutral expressions in classical conditioning studies (Lanzetta & Orr, 1980; Ohman & Dimberg, 1978 ). It appears to be critical that the face is directed toward the subject in these studies. Dimbetg & Ohman (1983; Dimberg, 1983) found that the differential effects of happy versus angry faces are reduced or lost when the face is directed away from the subject, and Perrett et al. found reductions in response as the facial stimulus was rotated away from a direct orientation.
and cognition portrayed in Figure 3 can be applied to both animals and humans. However, from the time of the Greeks, Western thought has distinguished between rational processes unique to humans and the processes governing animal behavior (cf. Cofer & Appley, 1964) . Both Plato and Aristotle denied rational souls to animals, but they granted them lesser souls capable of caring for basic bodily functions. Following them, St. Thomas Aquinas equipped animals with a sensitive soul and humans, in addition, with a rational soul. Descartes' dualism was similarly grounded in the distinction between the determinants of animal and human behavior.
Part of the revolutionary impact of Darwin's theory was that it challenged the longstanding conviction that humans have a rational soul that is absent in animals. Most have accepted this notion and regard humans as complicated animals, and that is perhaps accurate. However, there is one thing that all groups of humans have that no other animals have, and that is language. Only in humans does behavior come so completely under the control of factors that are mediated by language, including logic, reasoning, and social rules. This fact is at the crux of the understanding of the uniquely human aspects of motivation and emotion. Human motivation and emotion are based on biological systems, as they are in all animals. In both humans and animals, learning and cognitive factors build up an internal representation of reality that influences these motives and emotions. This kind of cognitive-emotional interaction is clearly not unique to humans. What is unique to humans is language, which has created a culturally patterned system of behavior control that is functionally independent of biology and is fundamentally different from anything seen in animals. Linguistic control systems enable humans to transcend personal experience, allowing the symbolic sharing of experience and the contemplation of possibilities that have never been and could never be experienced. This is not to say that there is a fundamental biological gap between humans and animals-that clearly is not the case-nor is it necessarily the case that animals cannot learn language. The point is that if an animal did learn language it would cause a fundamental change in the animal's behavior, because that behavior would then be influenced by a different sort of structure-a different principle of organization-in addition to the principles of organization that had previously determined the animal's behavior. The new principles of organization inherent in language are functionally independent of the old principles or organization inherent in the primes.
The development and maintenance of these linguistic control systems also requires a kind of motivation that is absent in animals: Needs for understanding and for cognitive consistency, for example, underlie the uniquely human attributes of logic and reason. Such motivation is a potential inherent in the structure of linguistic control systems, just as the biologically based motivation considered above is a potential inherent in the structure of the primes. Linguistic control systems also have emotionlike feelings associated with these motives: feelings of amusement, satisfaction, or dissonance associated with linguistic manipulation, for example. There may also be feelings of anxiety associated with the linguistic control of the primes. The relation of these linguistic motives and emotions to the biologically based primes is an issue of great interest.
I have argued that language makes humans different in fundamental ways from animals because it allows behavior to come under the control of principles of logic and reasoning that are mediated by language and are functionally independent of biology. With language also comes the patterning of social behavior according to the conformity and obedience to linguistically patterned social rules (cf. Milgram, 1974; Buck, 1976, pp. 400-414) .
Perhaps this is what Plato, Aristotle, and others meant by the human rational soul. There is irony here, for most of these philosophers assumed that the rational soul was the source of good and the animal passions the source of evil. However, it is reason, logic, and obedience to the rules that enable humans to execute and claim justification for a holocaust, the development and use of nerve gas, or the dropping of an atomic bomb. The animal passions play little part in the most monstrous of human acts.
Differences With Other Approaches
The present point of view differs from both traditional physiological approaches to motivation and recent approaches to emotion. In contrast to Tomkins's (1962 Tomkins's ( , 1963 theory and similar analyses of emotion, the present view (a) regards reflexes, instincts, and drives, as well as primary affects, to be motivational/ emotional states, (b) regards homeostasis and adaptation to be the raison d'etre for both motivation and emotion, (c) regards major aspects of the experience of motivational/ emotional states to be a function of a direct experiential readout independent of external expressive tendencies, and (d) argues that motivation/emotion can occur without an external readout and that indeed there may be motivational/emotional states in which no external readout has evolved. In contrast with theories that define emotional states according to whether their overt expression can be reliably differentiated, the present analysis defines primary emotional (and motivational) states according to biological criteria. The present analysis does not arrive at a single list of primary motivational/emotional states; such a list would differ according to the species and the level of analysis involved. For example, gnawing seems to be a more important phenomenon in hamsters than in humans, some states may be present at a physiological level (Emotion I) but not expressed in behavior (Emotion II), and so forth.
There is considerable controversy about what is emotion and what is not. Lazarus (1984, pp. 124-25) questioned whether the preferences studied by Zajonc and his colleagues should be regarded as emotions, and Ekman (in press) discussed how the startle is a reflex rather than emotion. The emotional status of pain has also been questioned. The present analysis includes a much broader range of phenomena under the rubric of emotion than is generally the case, and considers the distinction between reflexes, drives, and primary affects to concern levels of emotion systems (primes) rather than emotion versus nonemotions.
Like the approaches of Schachter (1964) , Lazarus (1966 Lazarus ( , 1984 , and others, the present analysis emphasizes the importance of the interaction between cognitive factors and physiological systems. However, the present approach considers the biological bases of the latter and the various aspects of responsephysiological, expressive, and subjective-in more detail. Also, different aspects of cognition, syncretic versus analytic, are considered. Furthermore, whereas these approaches assume that cognition precedes emotion-one must know what it is before one can respond emotionally-the present analysis agrees with the Gibsonian view and with Zajonc's (1980 Zajonc's ( , 1984 data, that initial emotional responding precedes cognition.
This approach has more substantial differences with theories of emotion that emphasize the analysis of emotion terminology (i.e., DeRivera, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, 1979) . The lists and structures of emotion generated by such analyses usually differ substantially from one another, perhaps because they reflect analytic-cognitive factors, the language of emotion, rather than prime systems per se.
The hierarchical view of motivation and emotion presented in this article is analogous in some respects to Maslow's (1954) theory of motivation, although there are significant differences as well. According to Maslow, human needs are arranged in a hierarchical fashion, including (from the bottom) physiological needs; safety needs; needs for love, belongingness, and esteem; aesthetic and cognitive needs; and needs for self-actualization. Maslow suggested that these needs are inborn and universal, or instinctoid, and that they will always appear under favorable conditions. However, the higher growth needs are not strong enough to appear until the lower deficit needs are satisfied. When a lower need is regularly satisfied, it in effect is eliminated from further status in the determination of the organism's behavior (Cofer & Appley, 1964) . The present analysis agrees that human motivation is based on universal aspects of human nature; it also agrees with the hierarchical aspects of Maslow's theory. However, it does not agree with the implication that when lower needs are satisfied they cease to affect the individual's behavior, or with the notion that higher needs are absent until the lower needs are satisfied. Instead, various levels of behavior control are seen to be simultaneously present and interacting with each other.
In contrast to classical physiological approaches to motivation, the present view emphasizes the importance of phenomena usually linked with emotion, even in the case of such basic motives as hunger and thirst. Also, it emphasizes the rich potential of using the rigorous and detailed analysis of emotional/ motivation expression in the study of processes usually approached at a physiological level. Many animal studies of brain functioning, to say nothing of human studies, are based on analyses of emotional expression, from Hess's (1928) observations of hissing and spitting cats, to Kluver and Bucy's (1939) observations of docility in amygdalectomized monkeys, to J. Olds's (1956) descriptions of frantic bar pressing. Recent authors have emphasized the importance of describing such behaviors more completely than they have been described in the past (e.g., Vanderwolf & Robinson, 1981 ). An example of such an analysis is Teitelbaum's use of a movement notation system originally developed for ballet choreography to demonstrate specific similarities in the akinesic gait of rats lesioned in dopaminergic systems and in human patients with Parkinson's disease (cf. Schallert, Whishaw, Ramirez, & Teitelbaum, 1978) . It is important to note that such observations can involve intact subjects, behaving freely and spontaneously in their natural environments. The rigorous analysis of the behaviors expressive of emotion/motivation may allow significant increases in the understanding of physiological systems in both animals and humans.
Summary
This article has presented the view that each species has evolved a set of primary motivational/emotional systems, or primes, which are special-purpose systems serving the basic functions of bodily adaptation and homeostasis. It is assumed that the primes are based on neurochemical substrates, that motivation consists of the potential for behavior inherent in the prime, and that emotion involves the readout of this motivational potential when activated by challenging stimuli. Three kinds of such readout have evolved, the most basic (Emotion I) being the readout of motivational/emotional states to adaptive and homeostatic mechanisms. The other kinds of readout have evolved as needed by particular species, an external expressive readout (Emotion II) occurring in social species, and an internal syncretic-cognitive readout (Emotion III) occurring to the extent of the species' cognitive abilities. It is suggested that each of these kinds of readout is associated with a distinct type of subjective emotional experience and that each prime is associated with a particular pattern of expressive behavior and a particular quality of Emotion III experience. Thus, the experience of a particular state (i.e., anger, surprise, happiness, hunger, sex) represents an amalgam of feelings from interoceptive stimuli (Emotion I), proprioceptive stimuli (Emotion II), and experience directly registered in syncretic cognition (Emotion III). This amalgam differs for different states, with Emotion III generally being more important for the differentiation of state than Emotion I stimuli or Emotion II stimuli, although this can be influenced by learning to attend to one aspect of emotion or another.
It is recognized that analytic-cognitive factors interact with the prime systems, and indeed it is suggested that Emotion III has evolved to foster such interaction. A general model of the interaction between the cognitive system and emotion suggests that it is in the context of such an interaction that complex human motivation and emotion can be most profitably understood. In particular, the ability to use language in interaction with the primes is suggested to underlie uniquely human aspects of motivation and emotion. Time will tell whether this ability will lead to the further advancement of the human species or to its destruction.
